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Burma’s ceasefire groups look ahead. 
 
It is never wise to try and second-guess the turn of events in Burma, but it’s 
safe to say that the current constitution-drafting National Convention is widely
perceived as illegitimate—both inside Burma and abroad. This perception won’t 
change unless the process is broadened to include meaningful participation on 
the part of the National League for Democracy, or NLD, and the United 
Nationalities Alliance, or UNA, a coalition of ethnic nationality parties 
elected in 1990, which has always worked closely with the NLD.
 
Despite the legitimacy deficit of the constitution-drafting exercise, the 
convention has emerged as the most important political arena since the 1990 
election—and perhaps even since the military takeover of 1962. For Burma’s 
ethnic nationalist communities in particular, it represents a milestone in 
efforts to have their concerns registered on the national political stage. 
 
Ceasefire groups speak 
 
The 1,076 delegates to the convention are divided into eight categories: 
political parties, representatives-elect (MPs from 1990), national races, 
peasants, workers, intellectuals, state service personnel and representatives of
28 armed ethnic groups which have agreed to ceasefires with Rangoon since 1989. 
 
The ceasefire groups are a mixed bunch, enjoying varying degrees of legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, they share several common concerns and have developed coherent 
positions on several key issues. Despite their reservations about the process 
most groups are attending the convention in good faith, in the hope of 
registering their aspirations on the national political agenda.
 
Can those insurgent groups which have “returned to the legal fold” use the 
ceasefire agreements to address some of the key issues which have structured 
armed conflict in Burma for over five decades? Participation in the convention 
seems at last to have created opportunities to focus on the “ethnic question” in
Burmese politics. 
 
Over the past few years, the Kachin Independence Organization, or KIO, and New 
Mon State Party, or NMSP, have taken the lead among a group of politically 
engaged ceasefire groups, in developing common positions on the main issues to 
be included in any negotiations with the military government—and the NLD. 
 
In contrast however, several ex-communist and other militias in northern Burma 
have been accused of following the junta’s line and of steering clear of 
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politics, in order to concentrate on local community and economic development 
programs (including, in some cases, the drugs trade). Some analysts have 
expected the junta to offer further concessions to the ceasefire groups, in 
exchange for their support (or at least, acquiescence) in efforts to complete 
the convention. 
 
However, since late 2003, the United Wa State Army, or UWSA, and other ceasefire
groups in northern Shan State have adopted positions very similar to the KIO and
NMSP—i.e., that the “sixth objective” of the convention, which guarantees 
“military participation in the future state”, is unacceptable, and that 
amendments are necessary to some of the 104 articles of the proposed 
constitution (agreed between 1993-96, before the original convention was 
suspended). 
 
Despite the military government’s longstanding policies of “divide and rule” in 
regards to the ethnic nationalities, the representatives of ethnic ceasefire 
groups currently seem more united that at any time in recent years. It is 
unlikely, however, that their concerns will be formally acknowledged at the 
convention.
 
In June representatives from 13 ceasefire groups made a joint submission to the 
convention outlining their main demands. This document calls for the 
promulgation of state constitutions (to grant state governments significant 
legislative and administrative powers), proposes that all residual powers lie at
the state level (rather than with central government), and requests a “bill of 
rights for ethnic nationalities”, as well as the formation of local ethnic 
security forces (a new role for the ceasefire armies). Crucially, the document 
calls for a federal union of Burma, under the rubric of “ethnic or national 
democracy”. 
 
Soon afterwards, however, representatives of the most politically active 
ceasefire groups were summoned by the convention’s Convening Work Committee, 
headed by Chief Justice U Aung Toe, and informed that their proposals would not 
be included on the convention’s plenary agenda. U Aung Toe reminded the 
ceasefire groups that the convention was recalled merely to conclude the work 
suspended in 1996, and to propagate the regime’s 104 proposals. As the ceasefire
groups’ submission fell outside of this remit, it would be forwarded directly to
the prime minister, Gen Khin Nyunt. But it remains to be seen if he can accede 
to the ceasefire groups’ demands or if junta chairman Sr-Gen Than Shwe will 
block such a move.
 
Leaders of the 13 ceasefire groups which signed this document—as well as several
others, including the UWSA, which submitted parallel proposals that also 
rejected the 104 principles—await the government’s next move with great 
interest. In the meantime, the convention has been suspended since July 9, 
supposedly for a two-month period of reflection and consolidation. It is not 
clear when the convention will reconvene—the last time the convention adjourned,




Despite this set back, the early outlook for the ceasefire groups looks good. If
any of their demands are accepted for inclusion in a draft constitution, it 
would represent a small victory for the ethnic nationalist cause and would 
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highlight the desire of elites within Burma’s minority communities for 
self-determination. 
 
The danger here is that the regime may attempt to buy the ceasefire groups’ 
support for the convention process by offering concessions over the issues of 
most concern to ethnic nationalist communities—such as regional autonomy, 
language use, local control over resources—in exchange for the ethnic 
nationalist bloc’s acceptance of ongoing military control of the central 
government. This strategy would expose long-standing tensions between the 
post-1988, predominantly urban-based “democracy movement”, and the movement for 
ethnic rights, initiated in the early years of independence. (The regime may 
also attempt to dilute ethnic state-level demands, by offering concessions to 
several relatively small ethnic groups in Shan State and elsewhere.) 
 
Alternatively, the junta will reject most—perhaps all—of the ceasefire groups’ 
demands. In this case, they will have to review their tactics and make a 
critical decision: whether to continue to take part in a bankrupt forum or to 
walk out on the process. 
 
This second scenario looks bleak. But whether or not their demands are accepted,
in expressing their concerns on the national political stage the ceasefire 
groups have laid the groundwork for the future. Regardless of the outcome of the
convention, it will never again be possible for ethnic nationalist proposals to 
be ignored when political elites discuss the future of Burma. 
 
Whether a future government is dominated by the NLD, the Tatmadaw, or Burmese 
armed forces, or some combination of the two—or perhaps even a fantastical US 
“provisional authority”—the ceasefire groups will have begun to place their 
aspirations on the national political agenda. Any future arrangement regarding 
the country’s future will have to take these into account. It should therefore 
no longer be possible for the international community to demand a resolution of 
the NLD-junta conflict first, before addressing “the ethnic question”.
 
The case of the Karen 
 
The last time Burma’s ethnic nationality constituencies were systematically 
canvassed as to how they should be governed was probably during the Frontier 
Areas Commission of Enquiry, implemented by the departing British colonial power
in 1946-47. Unfortunately, the Karen community in particular was notable for the
diversity and fatal contradiction of the views expressed by its (often 
unrepresentative) leaders. This confusion played directly into the hands of 
those who sought to “divide and rule” the ethnic nationality groups. History may
be on the verge of repeating itself. 
 
Official Karen participation at the convention is restricted to a handful of 
small groups, most of which are easily dominated by the regime; the militarily 
strongest of these groups, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, has almost no 
political leadership. Although a number of prominent Karen individuals, 
including a well-known doctor and several lawyers, are attending the convention 
as representatives of “national races”, “intellectuals” and “state service 
personnel”, the Karen National Union, or KNU, is not—despite the announcement in
December 2003 of a “gentleman’s ceasefire agreement” with the Tatmadaw. 
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One of the last significant insurgent groups in Burma, today’s KNU is heir to 55
years of dogged resistance to the Tatmadaw, giving the Karen ethnic nationalist 
movement a special symbolic weight in Burmese politics. Although the KNU 
currently has no place at the convention, if Karen leaders in exile and inside 
Burma can grasp the moment, they may yet be able to engage politically with the 
junta, while addressing the urgent needs of Karen society. But if they fail to 
act carefully and in unison, Karen leaders may forfeit the historic opportunity 
represented by the ongoing ceasefire talks. 
 
Meanwhile, debates continue within other ethnic communities over the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the ceasefires and over participation in the 
convention. The main arguments are outlined below: 
 
Post-ceasefire achievements: a limited “peace dividend”
Generally, the Tatma-daw perpetrates fewer acute human rights abuses in 
ceasefire areas than in zones of armed conflict.
There are greater opportunities for travel and local trade in and adjacent to 
the ceasefire zones.
The expanded role of civil society: local NGOs and community-based organizations
have implemented a number of important development programs in ceasefire and 
adjacent government-controlled areas. These include often-impressive local 
education projects, refugee and internally displaced persons resettlement 
initiatives, and some reconstruction of conflict-affected communities, such as 
in Kachin State.
 Post-ceasefire disappointments: missed opportunities for “peace building”
Extensive militarization, and the forcible mobilization of local communities, in
the context of Tatmadaw expansion into previously contested areas. Widespread 
land confiscation—especially well-documented in Mon State—illustrates the need 
to address the Tatmadaw’s self-support policy, and to de-militarize areas of 
former armed conflict.
Rampant post-ceasefire natural resource extraction and environmental degradation
undermines livelihoods, often resulting in population displacement—especially 
well-documented in Kachin State. (Villagers also migrate due to the dire 
socio-economic climate, often moving to get access to education and other 
services.)
The junta’s attitude towards development and trade in the ceasefire areas is one
of neglect, or active obstruction. Where infrastructure development does occur, 
it often results in “development”-induced displacement, or other abuses like 
forced labor.
Lack of political progress at the national or state levels has resulted in 
frustration within nationalist communities. Since signing truces with Rangoon, 
the KIO and NMSP in particular have made repeated calls for political engagement
with the military government. Despite obvious flaws, the convention remains the 
first forum in which they can air their demands since the 1960s.
 
Ashley South is author of the book The Golden Sheldrake: Mon Nationalism and 
Civil War in Burma. 
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